Implications of Global Trends for Seaborne Power Projection

By Frank G. Hoffman

The Global Trends effort has captured key trends about the proliferation of precision weapons and WMD.   Several regional powers are acquiring capabilities that appear to be designed to target US naval and aerospace assets and their supporting bases with greater precision and lethality.  The potential impact was noted in the last Quadrennial Defense Report in 2010: “In the absence of dominant US power projection capabilities, the integrity of US alliances and security partnerships could be called into question, reducing US security and influence and increasing the possibility of conflict.” 

The assessment of the threat to US power projection is in large measure based on the perceived impact of the growing anti-access challenge in general and the diffusion of precision missile architectures in particular. There is little doubt that the proliferation of relevant technologies is a reality and could accelerate.  Strategists and policy makers need to be alert as well to the development of new operational concepts by potential adversaries. The US Marine Corps has a well-earned reputation for never being complacent about its obligations in the face of emerging threats.

The current leadership of the Corps recognizes the need to rethink the problem of modern amphibious warfare and reassess the benefits that accrue to amphibiously agile states.  History, as Liddell Hart once intoned, suggests that this strategic capability has enormous strategic utility if not outright necessity. That said, even the Marines do not want to retain a mission only for nostalgic reasons or simply because they have sharper uniforms. It is necessary to explore the historical record and go beyond the surface to assess strategic implications if hard choices must be made.   

One cannot deny the fact that the United States has not had to conduct a large, fiercely opposed landing across a beach head since 1950.  But the United States has conducted over 108 operations with amphibious assets since 1991, according to statistics maintained by the Marines, from combat situations in Kuwait and Afghanistan to relief missions in the Indian Ocean, Haiti, Japan, and the United States itself after Hurricane Katrina.  In fact the usage of amphibious capabilities has doubled since the end of the Cold War.  

Looking forward, the United States has not lost its need to rapidly insert combat forces inland and violently strike against adversaries far from its own shores.  In fact, critical Department of Defense and Joint planning documents argue for greater access challenges, not less, given large reductions in overseas bases and political considerations that may restrict access.  Some of that access can be garnered through sustained engagement with allies.  But in other cases access may have to be obtained at risk in contested space.  Conducting forcible entry operations from the sea, viewed as part of a Joint effort, thus remains necessary.  Such operations provide the United States with a distinctly asymmetric capability.

Recognizing the importance of this asymmetric option and the challenges introduced by the diffusion of precision strike, Marine planners responsible for thinking with vision have for some time been pursuing an intellectual renaissance in amphibious warfare.  With the drawing down of forces from Iraq and Afghanistan, the Marines seek to return to their naval roots and burnish their core competency.  Naval journals reflect a significant increase in analytical efforts to preserve the capacity to conduct amphibious operations. 

Of course, the proliferation of precision means will impact ground forces at the operational and tactical level. Some Marines have been exploring concepts involving the use of robotics in both waterborne and aviation maneuver.  The Marines will need to reassess their ground mobility procurements to ensure that their troops have the force protection and active protective measures that they need. Future threats will present lethal and precise missiles, mines and munitions, which will mandate new defensive systems that Marines do not currently possess.  Nonetheless, recent exercises and war games like Expeditionary Warrior 2012 suggest that innovation remains alive and well in the nation’s smallest but most expeditionary service. 

Frank G. Hoffman is a retired Marine officer and Washington, DC-based national security analyst.

By jacquelinedeal Posted in GT2030

3 comments on “Implications of Global Trends for Seaborne Power Projection

  1. Pingback: “Global Trends”- CIA: Asia will as before be the center of economich development – Europa and US will losse their postions. Middleclass will be soon most important globally, but consume more and more, which will be a big problem for envi

  2. Pingback: “Global Trends”-Prognose der US-Geheimdienste: Asien überflügelt USA und Europa. Zum ersten Mal überhaupt wird eine Mehrheit der Erdenbewohner 2030 nicht mehr in Armut leben, “erstmals wird die Mittelschicht in den meisten Ländern da

  3. The main threat the USMC has been forced to address in recent years was Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who questioned whether it would ever be “sensible to launch another major amphibious landing again.”
    While Frank notes, the uses of “amphibious assets” have been numerous, they have always deployed via benign environments–not the ones they will confront in 2030. His logic goes awry concerning opposed assaults: “But in other cases access may have to be obtained at risk in contested space. Conducting forcible entry operations from the sea, viewed as part of a Joint effort, thus remains necessary.” One clearly does not follow the other–it would only be necessary if the cost/benefit appraisal works in America’s interests. Depending on the risk, we will not even consider an opposed amphibious operation when the large ships and thousands of Americans on those ships can be held at risk over 1000nm from the objective, and even if that succeeds, when the objective area would have to be sanitized against high-density, sophisticated area denial capabilities. Marine Corps acolytes will respond that they will land well away from contested zones–but that just requires more massive logistical support that must support land movement to a contested zone, and logistical support is just one of the Achilles heels of this type of operation.
    Could all these problems be solved through good old USMC innovation? Innovation doesn’t save you from countermeasures and capabilities that would break two or three US defense banks to bring into the realm of feasibility. On the other hand, if that force, as it has for the past fifty years, is only one that will conduct benign maneuver from the sea for less than vital reasons, then should it be as large, as expensive, or designed as it is today?
    In an era where the proliferation of precision is happening at light speed and at the high end (e.g., anti-ship missiles) and the low end (e.g., G-RAMM), the viability of expeditionary land assault must be called into question. That is what Robert Gates, who lacked nostalgia, was saying, and his warning continues to increase in salience today, let alone considering what we will likely face in 2030.

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